> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://doc.lockerprotocol.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://doc.lockerprotocol.com/reference/security-model.md).

# Security model

What lives on which device, and what the extension can never do.

## The one idea

**Private keys exist only on the Vault, and the Vault never has a network.** Everything else follows from that.

## What lives where

|                                            | Vault (offline)                      | Extension (online)                   |
| ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------ |
| Secret phrases and private keys            | ✅ encrypted with the master password | ❌ never                              |
| Addresses                                  | ✅                                    | ✅ (watch-only)                       |
| Balances, prices, activity                 | ❌                                    | ✅                                    |
| Connected sites, custom networks, contacts | ❌                                    | ✅                                    |
| Signature journal                          | ✅ encrypted                          | ❌                                    |
| Hyperliquid trading key (orders only)      | ❌                                    | ✅ encrypted with the wallet password |

## What each side can and cannot do

**The extension can:** show your accounts, prepare transactions, ask the Vault to sign, broadcast signed transactions, talk to websites. **It cannot:** sign anything on its own, export a key, or recover funds.

**The Vault can:** create and store keys, decode and display a request, sign it, keep a journal. **It cannot:** go online, broadcast, see balances, or recover a forgotten master password.

## Defenses in depth

* **Air gap.** Only QR images cross. A compromised computer can lie on its screen but cannot reach the keys.
* **Independent decoding.** The Vault decodes every request itself, from the bytes that will be signed, and shows it in its own words. The extension's display is *transport only*.
* **What is signed is what is shown.** Typed data is read on the fields the signature really commits to; a Bitcoin fee is proven from the transactions being spent, or the screen says it is not proven; an amount the bytes do not carry is named unproven rather than guessed.
* **Risk analysis on both sides.** Phishing list, look-alike addresses, unlimited approvals, account handovers, key rotations, chain mismatches. A proven danger locks signing behind an explicit acknowledgement.
* **Request binding.** A signature answers one request id; an old signature cannot be replayed for a new request.
* **The camera stays with the wallet.** A signature asked by a website is scanned on the wallet's own surface, so the *site* never receives a camera permission. Scanning inside the page is still one tap away, and the wallet says what it costs.
* **Consent, one card at a time.** A site's requests queue instead of stacking: you answer one, the next appears. A refused origin waits 30 seconds before it may ask again.
* **Encryption at rest.** Both halves use **PBKDF2 with 600 000 iterations** and the same password policy: at least 14 characters, one uppercase, one digit, one special character.
* **Self-destruct.** **10 wrong master passwords in a row** erase the Vault. (The counter is a local defence; the real protection is the long password and the 600 000 iterations behind it.)
* **Bounded inputs.** A QR announcing an absurd number of parts is refused before anything is allocated; a response body is read up to a cap and dropped past it.
* **Blurred camera previews.** Neither screen ever shows a readable code from the camera.
* **Reproducible builds.** The store packages can be rebuilt bit for bit from the source. See [Reproducible build](https://doc.lockerprotocol.com/reference/reproducible-build.md).
* **No CDN at runtime.** The extension ships all its code, fonts and logos; it loads no script from the internet.

## What is still on you

* Keep the Vault offline. The red banner tells you if it is not.
* Read the Vault's screen before tapping **Sign**.
* Keep the paper backup safe; nobody can restore an account for you.
* Do not give your phrase, keys or passwords to anyone. Ever.

## Reporting a vulnerability

See the `SECURITY.md` file in the extension repository for the disclosure process, or reach us on [Telegram](https://t.me/lockerprotocolwallet).
